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Race, Mental Illness, and Restorative Justice: An
Intersectional Approach to More Inclusive
Practices
Sabah H. Muhammad* and J. Michael E. Gray**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2019, a Black man faced trespassing charges in Georgia.
The facts of the case were not entirely about the trespassing offense because
the defendant had been “belligerent” with everyone who came near him from
the moment of his first contact with police. The court assigned a public
defender, and from her first meeting with her client, she knew why he
committed the offense and why he had been “belligerent” with police,
corrections officers, and nurses at the jail. Her client was shoeless, he had
open wounds on his feet, and his eyes focused on something both distant and
within himself. She knew those eyes, and she knew what they meant.
Law school had not prepared her for the systemic injustices that were to
come, but her lived experiences had. The attorney’s brother is also a Black
man with severe mental illness (SMI) who has faced serious criminal charges.
She understood what other stakeholders in the criminal justice system did
not—from the wounds on her client’s feet, to the seemingly inexplicable
*
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Advocacy Center and the DJ Jaffe Advocate. She is a licensed Georgia Attorney and holds
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trespassing, his violent behavior post-arrest, his inability to give anyone his
name (he sincerely did not know his name at the time of arrest), and his
incorrect belief that he was in North Carolina and not Georgia—her client
was too sick to help himself. He was too sick to access the tools to gain his
own freedom and would simply stay in jail.
Her experience also told her that the compassion a law enforcement officer
could have used to see, quite clearly, that the client was not a criminal, but
rather that the client was unwell, is systematically withheld from Black
individuals diagnosed with SMI during a mental health emergency. The
arresting officer alone had the choice to take the man to a hospital; they chose
jail instead. No matter the outcome of what was surely not the client’s first
or last criminal offense, she knew from the moment she saw him that she was
about to play a part in a series of injustices. There would be no justice for the
victim of the original offense, no justice for the community, and no justice
for the defendant who could not even form the intent to commit the crime.
The systemic failures did not begin or end during pretrial detention. In
court, the attorney had to try and find just solutions that did not exist. For
clients that commit a crime because SMI controlled their mind at the time of
the offense, the best place for them, once they are able to participate in their
continum of care, is at home. However, sending home a person accused of
committing an offense1 does not address the harm done to the victim and the
community, nor does it address the harm done to the invidual by years of
inability to access psychiatric treatment. The client would almost certainly
end up cycling through the criminal justice and mental health systems again.
Eventually, the attorney found the client’s family and learned he had
experienced a decades-long cycle of nontreatment and incarceration. The
only legal option to address his mental state was to delay. She knew that this
case would end with no long-term plan for treatment that could return him to
Family support is often crucial for effective treatment of SMI, but it is also difficult on
family members. See E. FULLER TORREY, M.D., SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A FAMILY
MANUAL 284–321 (7th ed. 2019).
1
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the person he had been before SMI robbed him of his ability to make
decisions. Even if he were temporarily stable, racial disparities in access to
treatment would likely keep him from remaining stable. The client’s status
as a person with SMI, combined with his race, made it far more likely that he
would end up cyling through jail numerous times before he ever received
adequate mental health treatment. Likewise, nothing about this client’s case
would change the reality that the community and the victims had been
harmed by his actions, and the court had no mechanism to remedy the
interdependant obligations owed to the victim, the client, and the community.
This article argues for an application of restorative justice practices that
would have benefitted the client and others who occupy the intersection of
race and a diagnosis that are both marginalized in different but overlapping
ways. Part I defines and explains restorative justice as it is currently
implemented in the United States. We specifically focus on widespread
shortcomings in the restorative justice movement in the form of
overrepresentation of non-violent white individuals and the common
requirement that they admit culpability to enter the process. Part II explains
the unique problems that SMI presents in adjudicating criminal offenses and
the compounded marginalization of Black people with SMI accused of
committing crimes. Part III is an argument for an expansion of restorative
justice practices to include some violent offenses involving people with SMI
who are Black.

II. BACKGROUND: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Restorative justice is a broad term encompassing many alternative
approaches to criminal justice. In recent decades, it has come to mean any
program or methodology used in place of or in addition to the existing system
of criminal law enforcement that addresses interpersonal harm done by
criminal activity to the victim and the justice-involved person, as well as
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harm to the community and society.2 All three participants—the victim, the
justice-involved person, and the community—are necessary parts of a
restorative justice model.3 For this reason, practitioners and scholars often
describe restorative justice as a triangle.4 The three participants are at the
angles of the triangle and the sides that connect the angles represent the
interdependence among each individual entity and the other two.

See Golan Luzon, Challenges Shared by Restorative Justice and Strict Liability in the
Absence of Mens Rea, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 577, 578 (2016); FANIA E. DAVIS, THE
LITTLE BOOK OF RACE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 35 (2019); Thomas L. Hafemeister et
al., Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and
Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 147, 191 (2012); Brenda Sims Blackwell & Clark D. Cunningham, Taking
the Punishment Out of the Process: From Substantive Criminal Justice Through
Procedural Justice to Restorative Justice, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 68 (2004);
Michael P. Seng, Segregation, Violence, and Restorative Justice: Restoring Our
Communities, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 502–05 (2017) (describing restorative justice
as a triangle: “On one side is the perpetrator; on the second side is the victim, often
described as the survivor; and on the third side is the community”). Typical restorative
justice approaches include circle sentencing, where everyone involved in the adjudication
of the offense sits in a literal circle and discusses possible remedies, family group
conferencing, involving the family of the justice-involved person, reparative boards, and
“victim-offender mediation.” Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Conferences, Circles,
Boards, and Mediations: Restorative Justice and Citizen Involvement in the Response to
Youth Crime, BALANCED & RESTORATIVE JUST. PROJECT 6 (1999). The latter approach,
“victim-offender mediation,” is widespread in North America, particularly with low-level
offenses, and is the principal type of restorative justice discussed in this article.
3 See Seng, supra note 2, at 502–05.
4 Id. at 502.
2
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Applying the main purpose of restorative justice, “that involves . . . those
who have a stake in a specific offense or harm to collectively identify and
address harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right
as possible,”5 is a practice that is prehistoric in origin and may be as old as
the first human civilizations.6 Modern criminal justice procedures, however,
are usually housed within the existing criminal justice system.7 They
therefore require enormous bureaucracies, federal, state, and local funding

HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, in THE BIG BOOK OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 50 (2015).
6 Hafemeister et al., supra note 2, at 191, citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 5 (2002) (“Restorative justice has been the
dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human history for perhaps all the
world’s peoples”).
7 See Chelsea E. Bullard, Mental Health Courts: A Theory-Driven Program Evaluation,
52–55 (Dec. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University) (available at
https://shareok.org/bitstream/11244/320943/1/Bullard_okstate_0664D_16015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YVB3-NTRV]).
5
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streams, sprawling courthouse complexes, jails, and prisons of everincreasing capacity. Discussing interpersonal harm and negotiating mutually
beneficial methods to address that harm does not require such elaborate
infrastructure and has been practiced by communities for millennia for both
practical and philosophical reasons.8
Formal procedures for restorative justice housed within the modern
criminal justice system date to roughly the 1970s and were a reaction to the
mid-to-late twentieth century state of crime and punishment.9 The United
States saw rising numbers in incarcerations and recidivism10 with the advent
of mandatory sentencing guidelines,11 a growing focus on prosecuting drug
offenses,12 and criminalization of brain diseases.13 Increased incarceration
rates posed financial and pragmatic problems for federal and state agencies,
See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 17–29.
Hafemeister et al., supra note 2, at 191.
10 See Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth
Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1225, 1228 (2010). Zimring notes the “contrast between the four decades after 1930 and
the three and a half decades after 1972 is stark.” Id. Incarceration rates in the former period
were relatively flat but increased significantly each year in the latter period. Id.
11 Congress authorized federal sentencing guidelines in 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994 et. seq., and
the Sentencing Commission promulgated the first Guidelines Manual in 1987, but state
legislatures began enacting guidelines as early as 1980. See e.g., Minn. Stat. § 244.09; see
Kelly Lyn Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of Variety, FED. PROB. J.
28 (Sept. 2017), for a general discussion of the first four decades of state sentencing
guidelines.
12 The number of Americans incarcerated at any given time for drug offenses increased by
1,000% from 1980 to 2018. DRUG POL’Y ALL., THE DRUG WAR, MASS INCARCERATION
AND RACE (2018), https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/drug-war-mass-incarcerationand-race_01_18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BFX-C2KM].
13 “Criminalization” refers to the tendency of the criminal justice system to direct people
with mental illness to jails and prisons. The term dates to at least 1972 when Dr. Marc F.
Abramson was looking for terminology to describe potential consequences of the
Lanterman Petris Short Act in California. See Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of
Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effects of a New Mental Health Law, 23
HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972). Correctional facilities are the largest mental
healthcare providers in the United States today. Matt Ford, America’s Largest Mental
Hospital
is
a
Jail,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
8,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/americas-largest-mental-hospitalis-a-jail/395012/ [https://perma.cc/M28W-UNQH].
8
9
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but also led to ethical questions about whether so many Americans should be
incarcerated, especially for particular types of offenses. Restorative justice
practices emerged as an alternative to more effectively address the harm done
by an offense than the existing system of confining an individual to a prison
after a lengthy adversarial process that serves the singular purpose of
incapacitating them for the time they are incarcerated.
A. Lack of Focus on Violent Offenses
The greatest preclusion for participation in restorative justice programs is
their tendency to focus on nonviolent offenses.14 Violent offenses are not
entirely excluded, but non-violent justice-involved persons make up the
majority of participants who benefit from these programs.15 Despite their
ancient origins and noble goals,16 restorative justice programs largely
function as one of the many diversionary tools for prosecutors, police, and

This is not to say that violent offenses are left entirely out of restorative justice theory
and praxis. Regarding theory, see e.g., ZEHR, supra note 5, at 19–20 (“[I]f the principles
of restorative justice are taken seriously, the need for restorative approaches is especially
clear in severe cases.”). Zehr’s assertion is at the crux of the argument contained in this
article for broadening restorative justice to include populations currently being left out
because of the nature of the offense and/or the presence of SMI clouding the legal elements
of the crime. For the limitations that focusing on nonviolent offenses place on restorative
justice approaches, see e.g., M. Eve Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence: A Critique of
Restorative Justice and Proposal for Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. REV. 123 (2016);
Arlene Gaudreault, The Limits of Restorative Justice, Proceedings of the Symposium of
the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature 7 (2005), https://www.victimsweek.gc.ca/sympcolloque/past-passe/2009/presentation/pdfs/restorative_justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P3UZ-VALY]. Some real-world exceptions to the restorative justice
focus on nonviolent offenses exist and are showing preliminary positive results. See Billy
Rankin, A Second Chance for Some Violent Criminals in Fulton County, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/second-chance-for-someviolent-criminals-fulton-county/vIiIZJfJufLuWlyHoaYBzM/
[https://perma.cc/XQH9D92T]. Fulton County’s community-based diversionary approach has elements of
restorative justice but is still carceral in nature—participants face the threat of prison time
if they do not comply with court-ordered plans. Id.
15 See Hanan, supra note 14, at 123.
16 See generally DAVIS, supra note 2.
14
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courts.17 As with any diversionary program, the people in the system with the
discretionary power to divert a defendant towards restorative justice
programs are highly unlikely to divert violent individuals for a number of
ethical, pragmatic, and political reasons.18 Contrary to the historic spirit of
restorative justice—finding remedies for harm outside of a criminal justice
system that itself exacerbates harm onto the triangle entities of justiceinvolved person, victim, and community—excluding cases of violent crime
leaves the most injured parties in society on the outside of restorative justice
looking in.19
The degree of trauma caused by an offense is subjective, as is any effective
restorative justice remedy, but violent and interpersonal offenses will usually
cause more obvious and devastating amounts of trauma to the parties
involved than nonviolent property crimes. The restorative justice movement
should apply its theories and praxis to all cases where there is an opportunity
to address obligations and alleviate harm, not just the cases that are
convenient for practitioners.

See Hanan, supra note 14, at 126–38.
See infra Section III.F (discussing political impracticalities to legislators adopting the
mens rea variant to diminished capacity). Similar political and ethical obstacles prevent
judges from diverting cases involving particularly violent sets of facts. Politically, most
states select judges through popular election and anything short of incarceration for people
convicted of violent offenses would risk disfavor with the electorate in many jurisdictions.
From an ethical standpoint, judges have an obligation to follow legislative intent, and
although they deviate from that obligation at times to follow legal precedence or their own
consciences, the dilemma of having an egregiously harmed victim can sway jurists against
non-traditional adjudication.
19 Most people incarcerated in state prisons are there for violent offenses. E. Ann Carson,
Prisoners in 2019, DEPT. OF JUST. (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3NF-L4LT]. The breakdown for federal prisoners is similar but more
semantically complicated. Most federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug or “public
order” offenses, the latter including “immigration” and “weapons” charges. Id. at 22. It
should be noted that there are far more state prisoners than federal, by a ratio of nearly
eight-to-one. Id. at 20–22.
17
18

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Race, Mental Illness, and Restorative Justice

B. Racial Focus of Restorative Justice (or Lack Thereof)
Four decades into the modern incarnation of restorative justice, social
justice advocates and anti-racist activists were troubled by the lack of racial
equity in restorative justice programs.20 They noticed and denounced “the
lack of racial justice consciousness within the restorative justice
community.”21 Most social movements in the history of the United States,
unless they originate within communities of color, tend to be by white people
and for white justice.22 Such movements tend to omit Black voices and other
voices of color from their inception through early implementation. In
addition to the lack of racially diverse voices within the restorative justice
movement, there was a dearth of research into the racial implications of its
practices.23
The lack of both theory and practice regarding race in restorative justice
was (and still is) especially alarming for two main reasons: the welldocumented and highly controversial racial disparities in incarceration rates24
By the early 2010s, the only comprehensive study on multicultural aspects to restorative
justice focused on mediators in two Scandinavian countries. See B. Albrecht, Multicultural
Challenges for Restorative Justice: Mediators’ Experiences from Norway and Finland, 11
J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIME PREVENTION 3–24 (2010); and that is
better than no research on the topic, but of limited relevance in the United States, which in
2010 had a population of 85.2 million people who were races other than white. Nearly 40
million of those people were Black. Karen R. Humes et al., Overview of Race and Hispanic
Origin, 2010 U.S. Census Briefs 4 (2011).
21 DAVIS, supra note 2, at 36; ZEHR, supra note 5, at 11 (“Another concern is whether in
articulating and practicing restorative justice, we are replicating patterns of racial and
economic disparities that are prevalent in society.”).
22 See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 36. Some movements originally excluded Black people for
reasons of overt individual racism, but anti-racists believe that any movement aiming at
social justice that does not include non-white membership and some element of non-white
leadership will inherently ignore or avoid just outcomes for non-white people because of
systemic racism. Id. at 31–37.
23 Theo Gavrielides, Bringing Race Relations into the Restorative Justice Debate: An
Alternative and Personalized Vision of “the Other,” 45 J. BLACK STUD. 216, 217 (2014);
see supra note 20 (citing the lack of research into multiethnic representation in restorative
justice).
24 See Gayrielides, supra note 23, at 218. The controversies surrounding race and
incarceration rates are rooted in highly problematic debates regarding the reasons that
20
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and the potential to compound long-standing distrust and disengagement by
Black people towards the criminal justice system. At the time that advocates
and scholars began noticing the troubling trend, the imprisonment rate for
Black adults in the United States was over six times that for white adults.25
Restorative justice will never achieve its potential and provide more fair and
effective results than the existing criminal justice system unless it actively
engages the people who are harmed the most by the current system. This
realization led practitioners and advocates to begin new programs,
conferences and scholarly research focused on bringing race to the fore of
restorative justice.26
In addition to the statistical equity of including racial consciousness in the
restorative justice movement, there is another reason to do so that transcends
case-by-case interpersonal healing: the potential for healing some aspects of
inter-generational racial trauma. Inter-generational trauma, the negative

individuals commit criminal offenses. Generally, it is a discussion over the inherent
disadvantages that result from structural and institutional racism, as opposed to racist
beliefs that people of color are inherently more inclined towards antisocial behavior. For a
treatment of the history and debate on race and imprisonment in the United States, see
generally Delaney et al., American History, Race, and Prison, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Oct.
2018), https://www.vera.org/reimagining-prison-web-report/american-history-race-andprison [https://perma.cc/FSD4-TUN9].
25 Carson, supra note 19, at 10. Carson defines “imprisonment rate” as “the number of
prisoners sentenced to more than one year under state or federal jurisdiction per 100,000
U.S. residents” and presents data from 2009–2019. The imprisonment rate for white adults
in 2013 was 292 and for Black adults it was 1,826, ergo 6.25 times higher. In 2019, the
rate for Black adults had fallen to 5.5 times the rate for whites—1,446 and 263
respectively—but that is still a gross overrepresentation of Black people in correctional
facilities.
26 See e.g., Gavrielides, supra note 23 (arguing that research into race and restorative
justice was long overdue by 2014). The National Association of Community and
Restorative Justice, which has held biennial conferences since 2013, focused its 2017
conference on racial aspects of restorative justice. 6TH NACRJ CONFERENCE PROGRAM,
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CMTY. AND RESTORATIVE JUST. (June 16, 2017),
https://nacrj.org/images/NACRJ_Conferences/2017/6th_NACRJ_Schedule_Online_616-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VMG-2JMM].
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effects of trauma passed down through multiple generations,27 has manifested
in Black people in the United States as often feeling distrust towards
numerous government institutions.28 The criminal justice system is no
exception: centuries of structural racism playing out in law enforcement
encounters, courtrooms, and carceral institutions have left Black people
understandably jaded and distrustful that those same courtrooms will produce
just results.29
By historically eschewing racial consciousness in restorative justice
procedures, some programs are missing an opportunity to confront issues of
race and crime head-on. Furthermore, the very location of many restorative
justice programs—within existing criminal justice infrastructure—risks both
creating hesitancy in Black victims and individuals accused of crimes to take
part as well as overreliance on components of the criminal justice system that
have failed throughout the nation’s history to bring just sentencing for Black
justice-involved people. The willingness of victims and justice-involved
persons to participate in a process and be open to empathy for all personal
factors, including race, is so vital to the restorative justice process that
ignoring the long-term context of race in the United States risks creating
ineffective remedies.

See Tori DeAngelis, The Legacy of Trauma, 50 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 36 (2019).
Although most research and theories related to intergenerational trauma are related to
Holocaust survivors and their descendants, a recent study indicates that racial
discrimination against Black people is causing trauma symptoms. See generally Monnica
T. Williams et al., Assessing Racial Trauma with the Trauma Symptoms of Discrimination
Scale, 8 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 735 (2018).
28 James M. Avery, The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust Among African
Americans, 34 AM. POL. RES. 653 (2006).
29 For data showing greater distrust of state and local courts among Black Americans, see,
e.g., DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS
IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY 10–12
(2003); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8–10
(July 2001), https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/archives/ncjrs/1891061.pdf?q= [https://perma.cc/T872-CNQ5].
27
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C. Admitting Culpability
Another requisite component of restorative justice, as it is commonly
practiced, is the assumption of responsibility for the harm done by the person
accused or convicted of committing an offense. Most restorative justice
programs require a basic understanding by all parties that the justice-involved
person committed the offense and that the commission thereof harmed the
other two players in the process: the victim and the community.30 The justiceinvolved person must therefore admit culpability to proceed with a program
that will likely have a solution they find more agreeable than the remedies
available under a traditional adjudication.31
This requirement of admitting culpability is intended to induce shame in
the person accused of wrongdoing. Two seemingly indispensable aspects of
restorative justice are that an individual must “express genuine shame and
remorse for his/her actions, and [that the] victim forgives the [individual for
the harm done].”32 Shame—meaning the justice-involved person feels
humiliation and distress because of their harmful actions—is sine qua non
(literally “without which, not”) to an equitable outcome in a restorative
justice procedure. Admitting culpability is therefore also a sine qua non
requirement for taking part in the restorative justice process.33 This admission
of guilt requirement is not just admitting legal guilt, as in an Alford plea, or
allocution prior to sentencing; it goes much further and requires that they take
responsibility for the harm done to both the victim and the community.34

See Luzon, supra note 2, at 580–83.
See id. The requisite admission of guilt, at least moral guilt if not also legal, can create
an element of coercion in some cases. If an individual does not believe that they should
admit responsibility for an offense but doing so is the best option to avoid incarceration,
their limited options could entice them to feign responsibility.
32 Hafemeister et al., supra note 2, at 195.
33 See Luzon, supra note 2, at 580.
34 See id. at 581–83; Hafemeister et al., supra note 2, at 195.
30
31
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III. THE MIND OF THE PERSON WHOSE ACTIONS CAUSE HARM
In the context of restorative justice, culpability is about responsibility.
Responsibility for a criminal offense begins with the mind of a person facing
criminal charges and answering the question—what was on that person’s
mind at the time that the crime occurred? This section discusses the mental
element of crimes in common law jurisdictions, exceptions to that rule, and
the devastating way that mental illness affects a person’s ability to form
intent. The section then takes an intersectional view of Black people impacted
by SMI and concludes with a statutory approach that accounts for the impact
of SMI on mens rea.
A. Mens Rea
The mental element of a crime, perhaps the most easily recalled Latin term
of first-year law students, is mens rea. In common law criminal adjudications,
“actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (“the act is not culpable unless
the mind is guilty”).”35 The act of the offense, the actus reus, is not enough
to convict the defendant; the defendant must also have the statutorily
requisite mindset at the time of the offense.36 The presumption of innocence,
a hallmark of common law jurisdictions,37 demands a person only be
convicted and punished if fully responsible for the crime. Accordingly, a twoprong approach—proving both the mental and physical aspects of an
offense—provides more hurdles for the state and more protections for the
accused. Mens rea is not merely an element of an offense but is an aspect on
equal legal footing with actus reus as elements of the prosecution’s prima

DAVID LANIUS, STRATEGIC INDETERMINACY IN THE LAW 113 (2019).
The exceptions to this common law rule are strict liability offenses. For a discussion of
these offenses and all their many problematic forms, see infra Section III.B.
37 See, e.g., Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law.”); R. v. Whyte (1988) 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (clarifying that the common law presumption
of innocence extends not only to elements of an offense but also to excuses).
35
36
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facie case.38 Mens rea is, however, arguably the more ethically damning of
the two elements because the actus reus either has or has not occurred and
either has or has not caused harm, but the mens rea is what caused the
individual to do the act that caused harm. To possess mens rea is to be
responsible for harm caused by the actus reus.
The Model Penal Code (MPC) calls mens rea by its slightly less archaic
name—culpability—and describes four different levels of culpability
available for statutory construction. Except for strict liability offenses,39 “a
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposefully, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently . . . with respect to each material element of the
offense.” 40
As a comprehensive approach to enumerate the true nature of the historic
but vague concept of mens rea,41 the MPC assigns decreasing levels of guilt
in a person’s mind to four states of culpability.42 A person acts with purpose
if it is their “conscious object to engage in conduct [that causes the result]”
or if they are “aware of the existence of [attendant circumstances] or hopes
that [the circumstances] exist.”43 An individual acts “knowingly” if “[they
are] aware that it is practically certain that [their] conduct will cause [the

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST. 2021).
See infra Section III.B.
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST. 2021).
41 The Court in Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952) commented on the “variety,
disparity and confusion of [various states’] definitions of the requisite but elusive mental
element.” Id. at 252. They continued to point out the consistency with which states require
a mental element to crimes but the inconsistency of language and meaning: “However,
courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised
working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as
‘felonious intent,’ ‘criminal intent,’ ‘malice aforethought,’ ‘guilty knowledge,’ ‘fraudulent
intent,’ ‘willfulness,’ ‘scienter,’ to denote guilty knowledge, or ‘mens rea,’ to signify an
evil purpose or mental culpability.” Id.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d) (AM. L. INST. 2021). For a treatment of the
historical and practical significance of the first MPC’s defining of culpability, see Sanford
H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943,
952–53 (1999).
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2021).
38
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resulting offense]” or if “[they are] aware that [their] conduct is of that nature
[to commit the offense] or that such [attendant] circumstances exist.”44
Reckless culpability is conscious disregard of a “substantial and unjustifiable
risk,” and that disregard must involve “a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe. . .”45 Last and least guilty
of the mental states, negligent culpability is present when a person “should
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct.”46 The negligent conduct also must,
“considering the nature and purpose of [an individual’s] conduct and the
circumstances known to [them], [involve] a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the [individual’s]
situation.”47
The most significant result of the distinct levels created by the MPC for
culpability is the implication of a hierarchy for the degrees of mens rea. The
MPC itself points out that, “when the law provides that negligence suffices
to establish an element of an offense, such element is also established if a
person acts purposefully, knowingly or recklessly,”48 and applies the same
principle for each kind of culpability.49 States that have incorporated the
MPC into statute follow the culpability hierarchy to ensure that more harmful
offenses and more severe punishments require a greater degree of guilt in the
mind of the defendant. New Jersey, for example, has largely based its
criminal code on the MPC, including the culpability requirements.50
Accordingly, the New Jersey judiciary has found that each ascending level
Id. at § 2.02(2)(b).
Id. at § 2.02(2)(c).
46 Id. at § 2.02(2)(d).
47 Id. (Note that an individual with reckless culpability must deviate “from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe,” while a negligent individual only need
deviate “from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe,” creating an
additional and subtle difference in the two types of culpability (emphasis added)).
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (AM. L. INST. 2021).
49 Id.
50 See N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2.
44
45
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of mens rea requires a greater degree of awareness.51 Therefore, a defendant
cannot be reckless unless they are also negligent, but the inverse is not true.
The mens rea requirement’s historical, moral, and legal status as an
inherent element to most52 offenses makes both legal scholars and lawmakers
loathe to statutorily relax or eliminate it from criminal statutes. There is,
despite the inherent justice of requiring intent before incarceration, one
common category of statutes that purportedly contains no mens rea element
at all—strict liability offenses.
B. Strict Liability: Exceptions to the Mens Rea Requirement
Strict criminal liability enables conviction without mens rea.53 Unlike the
degrees of culpability discussed in the previous section, strict liability creates
convictable scenarios absent purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or even
negligence in an individual’s mind. This lack of culpability is a historical
bane of retributivists because it seeks to punish a person who cannot be
morally responsible.54 Despite this well-reasoned objection to strict liability
criminal statutes, they are pervasive throughout United States jurisdictions
and come in many forms that produce varying levels of repercussions in
sentencing. Legislatures justify infringement upon the mens rea requirement
by including only low level offenses and correspondingly small sentences, at
State v. Williams, 919 A.2d 90, 95–96 (2007) (citing State v. Simon, 737 A.2d 1 (1999),
State v. Rose, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988), and State v. Sewell, 603 A.2d 21 (1992)). Even
jurisdictions like Kentucky, which have not technically adopted the MPC, still use a similar
hierarchy of culpability. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030 (using the terms
“intentionally, knowingly, wantonly [and] recklessly” to create a similar framework for
statutory construction and judicial interpretation).
52 See discussion of strict liability offenses, infra Section III.B.
53 See Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1079 (1997), citing, inter alia, Phillip E. Johnson, Strict Liability:
The Prevalent View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. 1518 (Sanford Kadish, ed.
1983).
54 See generally Christopher P. Taggart, Retributivism, Agency, and the Voluntary Act
Requirement, 36 PACE L. REV. 645 (2016); Kenneth Simons, Is Strict Criminal Liability
in the Grading of Offenses Consistent with Retributive Desert? 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 445 (2012).
51
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least in theory. In reality, strict liability offenses include a multitude of
statutory crimes from the smallest offenses and sentences to the most violent
crimes with the most severe punishments.55 There are two layers necessary
to understanding the latter categories of crimes—crimes of result versus
crimes of circumstance and incriminating strict liability offenses versus
escalating strict liability offenses.
First, strict liability offenses often omit mens rea because of either result
of the crime or circumstance of the crime. The classic example of a result
strict liability offense is felony murder.56 The defendant causes a homicide in
the course of committing a lower-level felony; they had the intent to commit
the lower offense, and that intent plus the result of the victim’s death equals
a murder conviction. The classic example of a circumstance strict liability
offense is a difficult topic, especially for survivors of sexual violence, but it
makes up the lion’s share of jurisprudence for this type of strict liability—
statutory sexual assault.57 In statutory sexual assault, the defendant intends to
have sex with the victim, but it is the circumstance of the victim’s age
combined with the physical act that make the defendant convictable. Whether
or not a defendant intended to have sex with an underage person is irrelevant.
Second, strict liability statutes also fall into categories of incriminating or
escalating offenses. As Golan Luzan explains: “For incriminating strict
liability, culpability is not required with regard to each essential element of
the offense. For escalating strict liability, culpability is required with regard
to at least one essential element but not for an additional element that creates
a more severe offense.”58 Luzon demonstrates escalating strict liability with
Luzon, supra note 2, at 584, 587.
See Simons, supra note 53, at 1077.
57 Id. at 1080.
58 Compare Luzon, supra note 2, at 586–87, with Simons, supra note 53. Luzon attempts
to improve the operative language that Simons uses to describe these layers and types of
strict liability. Simons described three separate pieces: 1) result and circumstance,
(discussed infra this section); 2) pure and impure (with “pure” meaning a textbook strict
liability offense such as minor traffic violations where no mens rea is required and
“impure” meaning an offense for which the law requires mens rea for at least one element
55
56
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the example of petty theft and grand larceny, in which an individual accused
of committing the offense only intended to commit petty theft, but the items
stolen reach the grand larceny threshold.59 In most jurisdictions, that
individual could be convicted of grand larceny despite not having the mental
state to commit that crime.60 Incriminating strict liability includes more
straightforward offenses, occurring when a statutory offense truly has no
mens rea requirement, as in minor traffic violations. The prosecution does
not have to prove that someone meant to exceed the speed limit, only that the
violation occurred.
The result/circumstance and incriminating/escalating dynamics overlap
significantly. Someone with no ability to form mens rea and who has no grasp
of objective circumstances at a given moment therefore cannot intend to do
anything that results from their behavior as it connects with reality. If that
person does not know that the human being standing before them is a person
or that the person is a police officer, can they then be held culpable for
murder? Does that culpability extend to the elevated offense of murdering a
police officer?61 A statutory scheme allowing a conviction in those

of the crime); and 3) criminalizing and grading strict liability. Simons, supra note 53, at
1079–82. The latter of the three is so similar to pure and impure strict liability that Luzon
combined them into incriminating and escalating offenses. We use Luzon’s terminology
because it is simpler to have fewer categories of differentiation among strict liability
offenses so long as they lead to the same level of understanding the law. In this case, we
can achieve that goal.
59 Luzon, supra note 2, at 586–87.
60 Id.
61 These are the facts of Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). The Supreme Court upheld
Clark’s conviction even though there was evidence that a severe mental illness,
schizophrenia, led him to believe that extraterrestrial aliens were threatening his life and
that the police officer he killed was an alien. The Court’s reasoning, related to limiting the
admissibility of mental health evidence, is the source of much scholastic ire and an
underpinning of the need for the mens rea variant discussed infra at Section III.F. For a
critical analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Clark, see generally Stephen J. Morse & Morris
B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v.
Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007).
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circumstances62 would apply strict liability—the result of the dead police
officer regardless of the person’s intent—and escalating strict liability—
culpability needed to kill a police officer is irrelevant as long as there is
culpability for some other part of the crime.
C. Severe Mental Illness
Although numerous medical conditions can impair one’s ability to form
mens rea, this article focuses on severe mental illness (SMI) and its impact
on a person’s actions. SMI is a narrow list of conditions that so substantially
interfere with the brain’s ability to function that an untreated individual
cannot, at times, take care of their basic needs, make rational decisions, or
conduct other life activities that a person without SMI can do with little or no
effort.63 SMI diagnoses include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, severe major depression, and other psychotic disorders.64
Individuals experiencing a psychotic episode may not, by definition, be able
to understand the objective reality of their surroundings.65 They may not have
control of their own actions and almost certainly cannot distinguish reality
from an alternate set of circumstances existing in their mind as a symptom of
SMI.66 Delusions, hallucinations, and other mental manifestations can cause
the person to act in ways that they would not act were they not experiencing
psychosis.67 In addition to those restrictions on mental and physical
functioning, many people with SMI do not know that they are sick and are

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (the statute under which the state of
Arizona convicted Clark).
63 64 Fed. Reg. 33893; Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness [https://perma.cc/PA78-XSHE].
64 What
is Mental Illness?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Aug. 2018),
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-mental-illness
[https://perma.cc/K6AB-9WT3].
65 TORREY, supra note 1, at 55–58.
66 See id.
67 See id.
62
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either experiencing psychosis or have a high likelihood that they may
experience psychosis soon.
Anosognosia is a condition when a patient has “no awareness of their own
illness or need to take medication.”68 Anosognosia presents “when specific
areas of the brain are damaged, as also occurs in Alzheimer’s disease and
some individuals with strokes. Individuals with serious mental illness who
are unaware of their own illness usually do not take medication voluntarily
and thus have a high relapse rate when living in the community.”69 In other
words, individuals with the anosognosia symptom of SMI truly do not know
that they are ill. A doctor, family member, law enforcement officer, or friend
can tell someone with anosognosia that they have SMI and are currently
exhibiting symptoms of psychosis, but that individual will not believe it. It is
not “denial”; it is a complete lack of insight into one’s own condition caused
by the damage that SMI does to the brain.
Whether or not a person with SMI has insight into the existence of their
own illness, psychosis can occur through no fault of the individual. In those
moments, a person with SMI does not have the same control over their
thought processes or actions that they may have when they are receiving
effective treatment. A person with SMI experiencing psychosis certainly
does not have the same control over motives and actions as a person without
SMI.

E. FULLER TORREY, AMERICAN PSYCHOSIS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
DESTROYED THE MENTAL ILLNESS TREATMENT SYSTEM 95 (2014).
69 Id. Anosognosia is a controversial topic among mental illness policy experts, but its
existence and impact on the brain and behavior of people with SMI is well documented.
Treatment Advoc. Ctr., Anosognosia 1 of 2, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88kG8Qx2Xs8&feature=emb_logo
[https://perma.cc/9KLW-FX8K]; DJ JAFFE, INSANE CONSEQUENCES: HOW THE MENTAL
HEALTH INDUSTRY FAILS THE MENTALLY ILL 253–55 (2017). Some studies have even
found physical indicators of anosognosia in patients’ brains through computerized
tomography (CT) scans. See F. Laroi et al., Unawareness of Illness in Chronic
Schizophrenia and Its Relationship to Structural Brain Measures and Neuropsychological
Tests, 100 PSYCHIATRY RES: NEUROIMAGING 49–58 (Aug. 21, 2000).
68
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1. An Analogy to Explain the Inability to Form Mens Rea
A bus driver is a twenty-year veteran of her city’s transit authority who has
never been late for work or run afoul of her supervisors. Most of the regular
riders on her route consider her a dedicated public servant and a decent
person. While driving her route one day, due to no fault of the bus driver’s,
she is incapacitated from behind by an unseen assailant who renders her
unconscious and takes control of the bus. That person then weaponizes the
bus and commits an atrocious crime—drives into a dense crowd of
pedestrians, killing many and wounding many more. The bus driver survives
the crash and when first responders arrive, the assailant has fled and is
nowhere to be found. Upon regaining consciousness, the bus driver is
astonished to learn that she will face criminal charges for all the harm caused
by her assailant.
For the purposes of this analogy, the bus driver is a person with SMI, and
the assailant is the SMI. The assailant stepped into the place of the bus driver
and controlled the actions of the bus like a subrogatious insurance company
steps into the shoes of the plaintiff.70 The bus driver was present, but she had
neither the intent to commit the criminal act nor the ability to stop it. She
likely was not even aware that it was happening. She neither had the guilty
mindset to cause the tragedy nor did she actually cause it, but it was, in a
sense, her bus. That is what SMI does to a person’s mens rea.
D. Race, Mental Illness, and Compound Marginalization
Black people are disproportionately incarcerated in the United States, and
correctional facilities are the nation’s largest mental healthcare providers.71
Although jails and prisons provide the most mental healthcare, they are

Subrogation is a contractual mechanism whereby an insurance company assumes the
rights of its client, i.e., “stepping into their shoes,” to sue a tortfeasor who has harmed the
client.
71 See Abramson, supra note 13.
70
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among the worst places to receive those services.72 Therefore, Black
incarcerated persons with SMI face a compounded discrimination resulting
in subpar mental healthcare services. Incarceration rates for Black residents
in the United States are several times that of white residents,73 but Black
incarcerated individuals are only somewhat less likely than white inmates to
suffer from mental health conditions.74 Thus, thousands more Black inmates
need mental health services at any given time than white inmates, but are
confined to receive the subpar medical treatment of the prison industrial
complex. Black inmates with SMI are a marginalized group within a
marginalized group: they are the overrepresented majority of the jail and
prison population within a system not equipped to provide proper care.
Two additional and intersecting factors lead to overrepresentation of Black
people with SMI in the criminal justice system: the barriers to healthcare
faced by Black people and the higher likelihood of violent outcomes from
police encounters for Black people suspected of crimes. First, barriers to
Black people accessing mental healthcare include distrust of medical
institutions,75 lack of “culturally competent providers,” and a
See generally Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzalez & Nadine M. Connell, Mental Health of
Prisoners: Identifying Barriers to Mental Health Treatment and Medication Continuity,
104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2328 (2014) (finding, inter alia, that inmates with mental illness
were likely to be under medicated in prison).
73 See Gavrielides, supra note 23; Bronson & Berzofsky, infra note 74.
74 Relative to incarceration rates, white inmates are actually more likely to have diagnosed
mental illness, but the disproportionately high number of Black inmates means that there
are many more Black inmates in need of mental health services than white inmates. As of
2012, white incarcerated persons were more likely to have a “mental health problem” than
Black incarcerated persons by a margin of about 20%, however, white prison inmates were
only slightly more likely than Black prison inmates to have experienced a “serious
psychological distress” (17.3% to 12.5%). Jennifer Bronson & Marcus Berzofsky,
Indicators of Mental Health Problems Reported by Prisoners and Jail Inmates, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 4 (2017). At the same time,
Black incarceration rates were 1,383 per 100,000 Black U.S. residents compared to 236
per 100,000 white residents. Carson, supra note 19, at 10.
75 See generally Bernice Roberts Kennedy et al., African Americans and their Distrust of
the Health Care System: Healthcare for Diverse Populations, 14 J. CULTURAL DIVERSITY
56 (2007) (explaining Black distrust in healthcare research and researchers); Lindsay Wells
72
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disproportionately high number of uninsured and underinsured individuals.76
Second, inability to access mental healthcare when SMI symptoms first
present exacerbates those symptoms and leads to a higher likelihood of
criminal activity.77 Once a person’s symptoms bring them into contact with
law enforcement, they face a higher likelihood of violent police encounters
if they are Black.78 The inability to form mens rea79 puts people with SMI at
risk of criminal justice involvement regardless of race. Black people are at a
higher risk of harmful criminal justice experiences regardless of SMI status.
The intersection of the two spaces—being Black and living with SMI—
compounds the risk of unjust outcomes and intensifies the need for alternate
approaches to adjudicating violent offenses committed by people occupying
that intersection.
E. The Mens Rea Variant
The denial of the state’s prima facie case due to the defendant’s inability
to form the mens rea element is what Professor Stephen Morse has dubbed

& Arjun Gowda, A Legacy of Mistrust: African Americans and the US Healthcare System,
24 PROC. UCLA HEALTH (2020) (commenting on Black patient mistrust of white
clinicians).
76 Division of Diversity and Health Equity, Mental Health Disparities: African
Americans, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 3 (2017).
77 See generally Off. of Rsch. & Pub. Affs., Anosognosia, Non-Treatment, and Violent
Behavior,
TREATMENT
ADVOC.
CTR.
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/backgrounders/anosognosi
a-and-violent-behavior.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX6W-SLTF].
78 See Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by
Age, Race-ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM.
16793, 16794 (Aug. 2018); MARK HOEKSTRA & CARLY WILL SLOAN, DOES RACE
MATTER FOR POLICE USE OF FORCE? EVIDENCE FROM 911 CALLS 31 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ.
Rsch.
Working
Paper
No.
26774),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26774/w26774.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4QR-D2TR] (discussing the propensity of white police officers to use
violence more often when responding to calls in minority neighborhoods).
79 See supra section III.C.
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the “mens rea variant” to diminished capacity.80 This section discusses the
mens rea variant concept, argues in favor of Morse’s assertion that every
common law jurisdiction should adopt it, and explains the practical barriers
to implementation of the mens rea variant.
Diminished capacity is the defense by which the defendant argues their
mental capacities were too impaired for them to be culpable for the crime.81
The mens rea variant takes a different direction (i.e., it “varies”) from that
logic by stating that a lack of mens rea means the defendant did not commit
the crime.82 One cannot commit a crime of which the mental state is an
element if one lacked the requisite mental state to commit the actus reus. In
the above example of the defendant killing a police officer, he did not commit
the crime under Arizona law because the offense contains a mental element.83
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed that his mental state applied to the
mental element of the law and decided that the state may “channel” evidence
of mental illness for one type of defense, insanity, but not another,84 thereby
siloing the same relevant evidence and treating it differently for different
defenses to the same crime caused by the same lack of mental faculties. In
the bus driver analogy above,85 the bus driver did not form the intent to
commit the offense, and even if she did, she could not have committed the
act. In both the literal and metaphorical examples, there is no mental element,
but some courts proceed as if there is.

Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 920–25 (2011).
81 See State v. Shank, 367 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1988) (ruling that the trial court erred by not
allowing “defendant’s expert to testify that, in his opinion, defendant’s diminished mental
capacity affected his ability to make and carry out [criminal] plans.”).
82 Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, supra note 80, at 5–7.
83 See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009).
84 Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, supra note 80, at 921–22 (commenting on
Clark, 548 U.S. at 772, 774–78).
85 See supra Section III.C.i.
80
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Jurisdictions should adopt the mens rea variant and make it available as a
defense, but jurisdictions should also keep other mental illness related
defenses available and apply them all in a way that allows as much evidence
as practical to prove that mental illness impacted the defendant’s actions. A
person whose SMI so severely impairs the ability to form intent cannot be
culpable under any of the culpability hierarchy in the MPC. Morse makes the
following argument regarding the insanity defense, but the same logic applies
to the mens rea variant:
Reconsider the facts in Clark. If the defendant actually believed he
was killing a space alien who was impersonating a police officer,
then he is not guilty of purposeful, knowing, or reckless homicide.
He would be convicted of involuntary manslaughter on a negligence
theory, however, because his deluded mistake was unreasonable.
But this defendant is not negligent in the ordinary sense. He cannot
correct the error by being more careful. He is irrational and does not
deserve to be punished at all. Conviction of involuntary
manslaughter is morally and legally obtuse in such a case of gross
lack of rational capacity.86 (Internal citations omitted).
Before even reaching the language of “being more careful” in the definition
of negligent culpability, the MPC requires that an individual’s actions be
within the bounds of “the circumstances known to him.”87 The circumstances
allegedly known to Clark were that aliens were trying to kill him.88 If a person
cannot be negligently culpable, then that person cannot be found culpable for
acting reckless, knowingly, or purposefully. There is no culpability, in a nonstrict liability offense, for a person with no mens rea.
Every jurisdiction should adopt and apply the mens rea variant.89
However, three obstacles—one legal and two practical—will prevent
Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, supra note 80, at 933–34.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. L. INST., 2020).
88 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743–47 (2006).
89 Adoption of the mens rea variant should be done in way that does not preclude other
defenses. Some jurisdictions have adopted elements of the mens rea variant, but at the
expense of also denying defendants the insanity defense. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §2186
87
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adoption of the variant alone from creating just outcomes in all cases. First,
some strict liability offenses contain no mental element, and those that do are
convoluted and difficult to reconcile with the mens rea variant.90 The second
barrier is political reality. Legislatures are, and will continue to be, hesitant
to enact criminal codes that could avoid any prison time for heinous offenses,
5209 (“It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result
of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the
crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.” (emphasis added)).
When Kansas allowed what courts call the “mens rea approach,” they also abolished the
affirmative insanity defense. The insanity defense is a Model Penal Code relaxation of the
M’Naughten rule. The latter allowed acquittal if a defendant did not know the nature and
quality of his actions or that the act was considered wrong and was the standard in common
law jurisdictions for much of the twentieth century. M’Naughten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (H.L.). The former absolves a defendant who “lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST., 2020). The U.S. Supreme Court
held in 2020 that Kansas’ abolition of the insanity defense was constitutional on the
grounds that, inter alia, the statute did not deny due process. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct.
1021, 1027–37 (2020). Kansas did not have to abolish the insanity defense when it enacted
its approach to mens rea. The “mens rea approach,” as adopted in Kansas, could more
accurately be called the “mens rea only approach.” The insanity defense has a controversial
history, particularly since the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan by John
Hinckley Jr. in 1981. Hinckley was found not guilty for reason of insanity, which brought
public pressure to limit the insanity defense. For a discussion of that history and an
argument for the preservation of the insanity defense, see Jacqueline S. Landess & Brian
J. Holoyda, Kahler v. Kansas and the Constitutionality of the Mens Rea Approach to
Insanity, 49 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 1 (2021). For a discussion of the implications
of Kahler and SMI generally on sentencing mitigation, see Michael Mullan, Sentencing
Alternative to an Insanity Defense,” 19 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 441 (2021). Despite the
public backlash to the insanity defense after the Hinckley affair, legal scholars are quick
to point out that it is hardly ever used in cases other than the most severe crimes like
murder, and even then, it is very rarely successful. See Marisa Tisbo, Criminal Law and
Mental Illness, 24 PUB. INT. L. REP. 61, 66 (2018) (citing Louis Kachulis, Insane in the
Mens Rea: Why Insanity Defence Reform is Long Overdue, 26 USC INTERDISCIPLINARY
L. J. 357 (2017)) (Tisbo notes that, “the insanity defense is raised in less than one percent
of all criminal cases, and it has a less than thirty percent success rate within that small
margin.”). It should remain in statute because it is a logical application of science to the
law, but defense attorneys need additional tools like the mens rea variant at their disposal
to fully allow for the impact of SMI on a defendant’s actions.
90 See supra section III.F (discussing the mens rea variant); see supra section III.B
(discussing the complex ways that legislatures incorporate strict liability offenses into
crimes that carry severe sentences).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Race, Mental Illness, and Restorative Justice

regardless of culpability. The authors of this article are experienced lobbyists
who are skeptical that many state legislatures will pass legislation in the
foreseeable future that theoretically allows for mental health treatment alone
or even dismissal of large numbers of cases involving violent crimes. The
public may perceive such legislation, though morally and technically
rational, as soft on crime, making it a nonstarter with many legislators. The
last obstacle is time; even if all jurisdictions adopt and apply the mens rea
variant, they will not do so any time soon. Legislatures move slowly and
judicial enforcement of code does as well.
Even if those obstacles did not exist, adoption of the mens rea variant is
still not a panacea. It does not address the fact that harm has been done by an
offense, even when the person’s illness means no mens rea and no
culpability. There was an actus reus, and because the actus reus harmed the
victim, the justice-involved person, and the community, there should be an
expansion of restorative justice practices.

IV. EXPAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Restorative justice programs should expand to include certain cases
involving violent acts committed by people with SMI because those
individuals have a different degree of culpability than violent individuals
without SMI and because there is evidence that Black people with SMI are
being left out of the restorative justice process.91
Restorative justice is accurately portrayed in literature and training as a
triangle with the angles being the victim/survivor, the person who committed
the act, and the community.92 Each piece is interdependent on the other two
for restorative justice to produce desirable and equitable outcomes. At least

DAVIS, supra note 2.
See Seng, supra note 2, at 502–05; MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE P3
PHILOSOPHY,
PRINCIPLES,
AND
PRACTICES,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/Segment_1-What_is_RJ_715_496905_7_554703_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAN9-FMKL].
91
92
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two of the three angles in the triangle—the justice-involved person and the
community—must admit some obligation stemming for the harm done by the
crime.93 The victim must be empathetic to the individual who committed the
act to some degree in order to move forward with an alternative solution to
incarceration that acknowledges and restores a three-way interdependence.
We propose a major addition to the triangle: incorporate the SMI that
limited or negated traditional culpability of the person charged or convicted
of an offense, caused the harm to the victim, and went untreated and
unaddressed by the community. This is not the fourth corner of a square and
it is not the metaphorical elephant in the room that merely looms over the
process; SMI is the driving force behind the offense and the resulting harm.
In this expanded form of restorative justice, an individual need not admit full
responsibility for all the harm done by the actus reus, but merely admit that
the actus reus occurred and it resulted in harm. On a case-specific basis, the
individual must admit that they and their illness are a part of the
circumstances that both the victim and the community want to address. Stated
differently, the individual may admit a subjectively appropriate amount of
culpability, but the SMI and the mens rea are inextricably intertwined.

See supra section II.C (discussing the admission of culpability and the role of shame in
addressing the harm); See ZEHR, supra note 5, at 29 (one of the principles of viewing
justice through a “restorative lens” is to “[a]ddress the obligations that result from [harm],”
including “obligations of the offenders, as well as the communities’ and society’s”).
93

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Race, Mental Illness, and Restorative Justice

The altered triangle does not create a new concept of the situation prior to
the restorative justice process, but rather a better means to express reality.
Whether or not those affected by any offense (i.e., one not involving SMI)
choose to engage in restorative justice, the reality of the triangle and its
interconnected parts already exists. Traditional restorative justice is just
acknowledging that fact to arrive at a more just solution than conventional
adjudication. Likewise, whether or not those affected by an offense involving
SMI choose to engage in restorative justice, the impact of the mental disease
is already the objective reality of the harm done by the offense. Our new
addition to the triangle only describes those circumstances and provides a
path towards better outcomes.
The context of race is a separate but often intersecting matter of relevance
to the paradigm of the victim, the justice-involved person, and the
community. Restorative justice programs should expand to include violent
offenses when the person accused or convicted of the offense has an SMI
diagnosis, should proceed with racial consciousness, and should also pay
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careful attention to cases where the justice-involved individual is a person
with SMI and one or more persons representing the angles of the triangle are
Black. Stated differently, the SMI status of the person who committed the
actus reus, the race of the people involved, and the intersection of those two
circumstances are all three areas in which restorative justice practices should
advance and expand.
This article is not the first to argue in favor of making room for the SMI
population in restorative justice practices. For at least a decade, scholars and
practitioners have pointed out the special circumstances of offenses involving
SMI and the applicability of restorative justice to cases in which the three
angles of the triangle are willing to discuss SMI.94 Some argue for expansion
of restorative justice programs to include people with mental illness but
downplay the significant opportunity for persons accused or convicted of
violent offenses once their SMI symptoms are managed by effective
treatment.95 Others argue for these types of restorative justice programs to be
housed within mental health courts,96 which is a somewhat practical idea, but
would leave gaps in available programs in jurisdictions without mental health
courts97 and would not address the tendency of mental health courts to focus
on nonviolent offenses and mental health disorders other than SMI. Yet

See e.g., Hafemeister et al., supra note 2; Jessica Burns, A Restorative Justice Model
for Mental Health Courts, 23 REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 427 (2014).
95 Hafemeister et al., supra note 2. While this article is critical of others that opened the
door to the idea of restorative justice for people with SMI without fully embracing the
potential to address harm done by violent offenses, we do not mean to denigrate the work
of Hafemeister et al. or others cited in this section. To the contrary, the place for cases
involving SMI restorative justice practices is such a logical use of both those practices and
certain methods of mental healthcare treatment that we are merely building on what
Hafemeister and others have proposed.
96 Burns, supra note 94.
97 Mental health courts are also rooted in carceral systems, which is problematic for any
program designed to avoid or reduce incarceration through restorative justice. Lauren
Almquist & Elizabeth Dodd, Mental Health Courts: A Guide to Research-Informed Policy
and Practice, COUNS. OF ST. GOV’TS JUST. CENTER 5 (2009) (defining mental health
courts as integrated into the court system).
94
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others make a similar argument regarding violent offenses, but with a narrow
scope.98
This article differs in that we seek to treat the brain disease and society’s
inability to address it at an earlier stage as not just the underlying appropriator
of mens rea, but also as the overarching cause of the circumstances that
allowed the offense to occur. With that perspective, state and local
jurisdictions should expand restorative justice programs at varying points
along the adjudication process to include opportunities for the victims, the
community, and the justice-involved individuals with SMI, regardless of
whether there is a violent component to the offense. What matters is the
subjective willingness of the three entities constituting the angles of the
triangle to accept the overarching nature of SMI. We also urge any expansion
of restorative justice to be through the critical lens of criminalization and
race, an approach that will further the goal of contemporary racial justice
through restorative justice and ensure the maximum number of appropriate
SMI-related cases receive consideration for expanded programs.
A. Community Obligation
Harm resulting from untreated or undertreated SMI is, at least in part, the
fault of a mental healthcare system lacking in resources and legal
mechanisms to intervene with appropriate treatment prior to the crisis point.
Community organizations, healthcare systems, and state and local
governments can reduce the likelihood of criminal activity through voluntary
treatment or involuntary civil commitment.99 Failure to do so is the
Liesel J. Danjczek, The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act and
Its Inappropriate Non-Violent Offender Limitation, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 69 (2007) (arguing that a specific piece of federal funding for restorative justice
should include violent offenses).
99 See Lisa Dailey et al., Grading the States: An Analysis of U.S. Psychiatric Treatment
Laws,
TREATMENT
ADVOC.
CTR.
9–13
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
grading-the-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WBH-ABQC] (defining and discussing the
aspects of involuntary civil commitment).
98
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community’s contribution to the situation that created the harm of a criminal
offense. A restorative outcome in such cases should include various
organizations admitting this failure and taking steps to prevent future harm.
The entities responsible for treating SMI should look back at the medical
and criminal history of an individual and identify missed opportunities for
earlier intervention. For example, if an individual stabbed two strangers on a
public street while in a psychotic state,100 the mental health providers and
civil commitment programs in the jurisdiction should address the question of
where along that individual’s path from stability to crisis to violence they
could have intervened and provided treatment before the offense occurred.101
Such a review of missed opportunities will help both the victim and person
who committed the act understand the circumstances of the offense and help
the mental healthcare system avoid future violent incidents.
In addition to missed opportunities to treat a specific individual with SMI
prior to their justice involvement, state and local governments should
examine their ability to effectively utilize involuntary civil commitment
statutes. Involuntary civil commitment is a mechanism that allows courts to
order a person with SMI into either inpatient or outpatient treatment if their
symptoms prevent them from making rational decisions regarding their own
psychiatric care or basic needs.102 These statutes are a way for legal and
100 These

are the alleged facts of a 2021 case in California. Man Charged with Stabbing
Two Asian women in San Francisco, AP NEWS (May 6, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/san-francisco-3d5caeb3bcf099a8261e34a793fc96c0
[https://perma.cc/F6LY-BMXL].
101 Outpatient civil commitment is legal in forty-seven states and D.C. For examples of
statutes used on a consistent basis, see, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE L. § 9.60; see also,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122 et seq.
102 All fifty states and D.C. allow inpatient commitment. However, great discrepancies
exist as to both the effectiveness of statutory language and utilization by local jurisdictions
within the states. Existing data indicates that higher utilization of involuntary commitment
statutes reduces the likelihood of future hospitalization and criminal justice involvement.
See Swanson et al., Involuntary Out-patient Commitment and Reduction of Violent
Behavior in Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRITISH J. OF PSYCHIATRY 324, 327–
29 (2000); Phelan et al., Effectiveness and Outcomes of Assisted Outpatient Treatment in
New York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 137 (2010). However, the use and even the
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mental healthcare systems to access treatment for people with SMI before
their symptoms reach the point of danger to themselves or others. To prevent
tragic consequences, civil commitment laws should contain, at minimum,
emergency evaluation periods of seventy-two hours or more,103 access for
any responsible adult to petition the court,104 criteria for grave disability, and
a psychiatric deterioration standard.105 Grave disability and psychiatric
existence of these laws is controversial. As John Monahan points out, “[t]reating people
with mental disorder without their consent always has been the defining human rights issue
in mental health law.” John Monahan, Mandated Community Treatment: Applying
Leverage to Achieve Adherence, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 282 (2008). The
controversy stems from fundamental disagreements about the meaning of an individual’s
right to access psychiatric treatment. Advocates who abhor involuntary commitment
believe it is a restriction on civil liberties, while advocates who support broader and more
effective implementation of these laws point out that SMI can rob a person of their ability
to make rational decisions regarding their own healthcare (see discussion of anosognosia
supra at Section III.C.) and involuntary commitment is less restrictive on civil liberties
than criminal justice involvement, which is often the result of non-treatment. See Swanson
et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Arrests Among Persons with
Severe Mental Illness?, 28 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 156 (2001) (concluding that outpatient
commitment can reduce criminal justice contacts).
103 See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.153(1) (2021) (“[A person meeting the state’s
dangerousness standard shall be] taken into emergency custody in an evaluation and
treatment facility . . . for not more than seventy-two hours”). Washington’s emergency
hold duration is increasing to 120 hours in 2026; OR. REV. STAT. § 426.232(2) (2019)
(allowing emergency holds of up to five “judicial days”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11
(2009) (“right to hearing within seven days of admission”).
104 See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-520(A), 36-524(B), and 36-531(B) (2021) (allowing
any responsible adult access to petition the court for an emergency evaluation of an
individual in crisis, but disallowing public access to petition the court for inpatient
commitment); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1434 (2019) (“Any individual 18 years of age or
over may file with the court a petition that asserts that an individual is a person requiring
treatment.”); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.150(1), 71.05.153(1) (2021). Washington allows
only first responders to file petitions for emergency detention, which is a problematic
barrier to mental healthcare. Narrowly limiting who can petition the court means that
family members who see their loved one’s deteriorating condition, healthcare providers
who identify indicators that a patient may harm themselves, and others with firsthand
knowledge of a dangerous situation are barred from filing petitions.
105 Grave disability is the inability, caused by SMI, of a person to provide for their own
basic needs. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(9) (2020) (“‘[G]ravely disabled’ means
a condition in which a person as a result of mental illness . . . is in danger of physical harm
arising from such complete neglect of basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal
safety as to render serious accident, illness, or death highly probable if care by another is
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deterioration are the criteria by which a court can assess an individual’s
dangerousness to self or others, and they should not require that the threat of
danger be imminent. Requiring imminence is one of the most common
methods of delaying treatment until the point of emergency and violence, and
some states have dropped imminence requirements from their laws to allow
treatment before crisis.106 The mental health treatment system in a given
community or state cannot adequately intervene at the early stages of a crisis
without civil commitment options to curtail escalation of a person’s
psychosis and deterioration of the person’s mental health.
Some forms of civil commitment could also be used on the back end of
crisis as part of a restorative justice approach to remedy the harm caused by
the community’s failure to treat an individual earlier. One evidence-based
example of a civil commitment mechanism that could be used is assisted
outpatient treatment (AOT). AOT is an involuntary commitment to a
treatment plan administered to people diagnosed with SMI while living in the
community instead of an inpatient facility.107 AOT programs often include
court monitoring of a thorough and individually-tailored plan to keep an
not taken.”). Psychiatric deterioration, also known as the “need for treatment” standard, is
a condition in which a person will suffer harm if they do not receive psychiatric treatment.
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 § 7101(16) (2020) (“‘A person in need of treatment’
means a person who has a mental illness and, as a result of that mental illness, his or her
capacity to exercise self-control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of his or her affairs
and social relations is so lessened that he or she poses a danger of harm to himself, to
herself, or to others . . .”).
106 See, e.g., 16 DEL. C. §§ 5001(3), (4) (2021). For a general discussion of the imminence
requirement and the gradual loosening of the standard, see SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ET AL, CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND THE MENTAL HEALTH CARE CONTINUUM: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND
PRINCIPLES
FOR
LAW
AND
PRACTICE
4,
8–9,
16
(2019),
https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88QZ-6N67].
107 See BRIAN STETTIN ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. & NE. OHIO MED. U.,
IMPLEMENTING ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, BUILDING
BLOCKS
AND
TIPS
FOR
MAXIMIZING
RESULTS
8
(2019),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/backgrounders/White_Pape
r_FINAL_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMF7-BTXW] (defining AOT).
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individual who has been previously hospitalized from deteriorating to the
point of needing inpatient psychiatric treatment again. Participants in these
programs, although under court order, are not subject to contempt and
incarceration if they do not adhere to the plan, but rather are subject to
inpatient commitment until they are stable enough to reengage in outpatient
treatment.108 AOT is available as a civil remedy in forty-seven states and D.C.
and has shown positive results in preventing tragic outcomes from SMI.109
With the agreement of the victim and the assurance of the community mental
health system to have psychiatric services in place, AOT should be
considered as a part of a restorative justice approach for people with SMI
who commit violent offenses. Just as in purely civil AOT proceedings, the
person under a court order should not be held under threat of incarceration
after failing to participate in the program, but rather inpatient commitment.
With the goal of treating an individual’s SMI so that the individual does not
commit future criminal offenses, courts can utilize the metaphorical carrot of
AOT and the stick of civil inpatient commitment rather than carceral threats
like prison and probation.
B. Victim’s Understanding of SMI
A working knowledge of SMI among all participants in the process is
necessary for empathy to play its traditional and vital role in restorative
justice for violent offenses involving mental illness. Victims will need to
learn and understand objective medical facts about SMI—e.g., SMI’s effect
on the brain, the involuntary and indiscriminate occurrence of SMI in the
general population, and anosognosia—as well as the consequences of
nontreatment, the missing pieces in the mental health treatment system, and
other contributing factors that led the person to commit the actus reus.
108 See,

e.g., IDAHO CODE § 66-329(12) (2021); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.097(5)
(2020).
109 See supra note 102 (discussing controversies around AOT and involuntary commitment
generally).
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Several organizations110 already have training available on SMI and the
mental health system for people who have little or no prior knowledge of the
issues. Those programs are usually geared towards either people living with
SMI or their relatives and caregivers but could be modified to educate victims
of offenses or at least as sources for training materials and approaches.111
Engagement from the victim will require some understanding of the illness
that caused the offense and how these types of cases differ from cases in
which the perpetrator does not have SMI. In cases not involving SMI,
conferencing often involves discussion of an individual’s motives in order to
move them towards understanding the harm they caused.112 In offenses
involving SMI, however, the illness itself can be the reason that a person
committed the actus reus and harmed the victim and community. Victim
education on these issues is therefore vital to address harm and meet the
obligations created by it.113
C. Justice-Involved Person’s Obligation
The approach proposed in this article differs significantly from traditional
restorative justice with respect to the justice-involved person’s admission of

110 See

infra note 111.
an example of a comprehensive program designed to educate families and
caregivers of people with SMI, see NAMI Family to Family, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL
ILLNESS,
https://www.nami.org/Support-Education/Mental-Health-Education/NAMIFamily-to-Family [https://perma.cc/X7NP-MM9H].
112 LORRAINE STUTZMAN AMSTUTZ, THE LITTLE BOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER
CONFERENCING: BRINGING VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS TOGETHER IN DIALOGUE, in THE
BIG BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 121–23 (2015).
113 It is already difficult for victims to take part in restorative processes, particularly those
involving violent crimes. Victim-offender conferencing in violent cases tend to be initiated
by victims due to the heightened level of trauma and harm relative to other cases. See id.
at 167. Expecting a victim to also learn enough about the condition of the person who
committed a harmful act to have a productive and restorative process is a significant hurdle,
but not an insurmountable one. Regardless of how they arrived at the point of applying
restorative practices to violent cases, victims can still benefit from conferencing with
people who caused them harm. See, e.g., id. (relaying an anecdotal positive outcome in
such a case, but note that it does not involve SMI).
111 For
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culpability. First, in a restorative justice plan involving an individual with
SMI, it may not be necessary to determine how much culpability lies with
the individual and how much was appropriated by the illness. Second, the
shame factor in the individual114 may not be integral in these cases. It is only
necessary that the victim and the community acknowledge that SMI played
a role in the likely preventable offense and that the person with SMI
physically performed the actus reus. The former point is necessary for the
person with SMI to join the process, and the latter point will be the first
requisite in a more just outcome for the victim and the community. By
beginning with those admissions, all parties can proceed to understanding
SMI and its relevance to the offense. If the victim, justice-involved person,
and community are to understand each other’s perspectives and foster the
empathy necessary for a just outcome, then understanding every relevant
piece of each other’s experiences should be a goal of restorative justice.
D. Racial Consciousness and the Intersection of Race and SMI
People with SMI who have committed a violent offense and are also Black
occupy an intersection of law, healthcare, and society that compounds
multiple systemic shortcomings. Those shortcomings in turn fail
intersectional individuals through over-policing, undertreating, and imposing
harmful stereotypes from the earliest onset of SMI symptoms through the
adjudication of crimes caused by SMI. Restorative justice programs should
take these factors into account and address the ways that the intersection of
race and SMI brought about the harm done by the offense.
We recommended in Part B of this Section that victims who have been
harmed by the SMI symptoms of another should take part in training to
understand SMI as part of a restorative process; likewise, both victims and
community representatives should learn about systemic racism and implicit
racial bias to understand the compound harms done to a Black person living
114 See

supra Section III.C (discussing the shame factor in restorative justice).

VOLUME 20 • ISSUE 1 • 2021

195

196 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

with SMI prior to the violent act that led to their arrest. The
overrepresentation of Black people in carceral institutions,115 combined with
the subpar quality of mental healthcare for both the general public and
incarcerated persons, are both contributing factors to the harm done by Black
people living with SMI. Furthermore, a patient’s race is often a contributing
factor to misdiagnosis and undertreatment of SMI, regardless of whether they
are incarcerated.116 If the victim and community stakeholders understand that
context, it will become possible to hold responsible the appropriate parts of
the criminal justice system, healthcare systems, and other historically racist
institutions that contributed to the harm.117 It is only through the lens of both
SMI and race that restorative justice practices can adequately engage
stakeholders in a process that addresses essential elements of the harm
stemming from the awful intersection.

115 See

Carson, supra note 19 (discussing the disproportionately high incarceration rate of
Black people in the United States).
116 See Michael A. Gara et al., A Naturalistic Study of Racial Disparities in Diagnoses at
an Outpatient Behavioral Health Clinic, 70 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 130 (2019) (showing that
Black men are more likely to be misdiagnosed with schizophrenia than white men); Derek
H. Suite, Beyond Misdiagnosis, Misunderstanding and Mistrust: Relevance of the
Historical Perspective in the Medical and Mental Health Treatment of People of Color, 99
J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 879 (2007) (discussing historical “mistrust and underutilization of
[mental health] services by people of color”).
117 See Fiscella et al., Inequality in Quality: Addressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Care, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2579, 2580 (2000) (“Socioeconomic
position and race/ethnicity is associated with potentially avoidable procedures . . . hospital
readmissions, and untreated disease.”). For a discussion of implicit bias, i.e., “unconscious
racism” and its impact on healthcare, see DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A
CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 33–54 (2015). It is also worth
noting that the American healthcare system is not only dealing with unconscious racism,
but also, like many parts of our society, is still feeling the impact of the 20th century’s
blatant institutional racism. Hospitals in the Jim Crow south were largely segregated, with
Black facilities providing predictably subpar care. It was not until the Social Security
Amendments of 1965—Medicare and Medicaid’s enabling legislation—that the federal
government leveraged the promise of guaranteed revenue streams to force integration. See
David Barton Smith, Civil Rights and Medicare: Historical Convergence and Continuing
Legacy, in COHEN ET AL., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID AT 50: AMERICA’S ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAMS IN THE AGE OF AFFORDABLE CARE (2015).
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V. CONCLUSION
Expanding restorative justice to include people living with SMI, even for
violent offenses, will address community obligations currently
underrepresented in criminal adjudications. It will also allow victims and
justice-involved persons to reconcile the role that the intersection of SMI and
the marginalization of Black people in American society play in criminal
justice. Jurisdictions should also adopt the mens rea variant to diminished
capacity without weakening or deleting existing statutory defenses.
However, only expanding restorative justice in the ways described in this
article will create a broad enough approach to encompass offenses caused by
SMI while addressing the intersectional implications for Black justiceinvolved persons and victims.
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